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Abstract − This paper examines the changes in the inter-industry wage structure experienced by Russia
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The structure of inter-industry wage dierentials in the United States is well documented,
for example in Krueger and Summers (1988), Murphy and Welch (1992) and Gibbons and
Katz (1992). Very little research has been undertaken in the area of the inter-industry wage
structure for Russia. Gregory and Kohlhase (1988) examine the wage structure using a sample
of Russian immigrants to the United States. However, two household panel data sets have
recently become available for Russian residents: the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey
(RLMS) and the Russian Socio-Economic Transition Panel (RUSSET). The aim of this paper
is to examine the structure of and changes in the inter-industry wage structure in Russia
during the period 1993-1999. We follow and expand on the example of Haisken-DeNew and
Schmidt (1997) in calculating industry wage dierentials and we expand on this. In Section II,
background information is provided on the Soviet and Post-Soviet wage structure and wage
setting mechanisms. We discuss the common phenomenon of \wage arrears", experienced by
about half of all employees over this time period. In Section III, we outline the two Russian
household panel data sets used in the analysis. In Section IV, we provide estimates of the
Russian wage structure, concentrating on inter-industry wages, also discussing the eects of
government ownership, unobserved individual heterogeneity, the role of Soviet nomenclatura
networking. We discuss not only the overall inter-industry wage structure but also the dynamics
observed over this time period. Section V draws some conclusions from this paper's results.
II. Background
A. Soviet Wage Structure
Russia is an interesting case with its transition away from plan economy, input hoarding,
over-qualication and over-employment to a market based economy. In the Soviet Planned
1Economy wages were largely determined by the central planning authorities. According to
Chapman (1979), the earnings of a industrial worker mainly consisted of a basic wage rate
reﬂecting the workers skill level and the responsibilities connected with their work. The clas-
sication of workers followed common standards according to the \Unied Wage-Qualication
Handbook", which specied the respective skill level and responsibilities that were required for
each occupation. The basic wage rates were however allowed to dier between industries. In
addition to the basic wage rate, various supplements for working conditions and overtime work
were also paid. Moreover, there existed the possibility of regional supplements.
Earnings of salaried employees were determined according to a similar pattern depending
on the position's respective skill level and the responsibilities it required. Earnings of salaried
employees also diered between industries, thus reﬂecting the industries' relative importance
for the national economy as a whole.
Gregory and Kohlhase (1988) estimated reduced-form earnings equations with standard
human capital indicators, industry dummies and indicators of political loyalty for a sample
of 2793 former Soviet citizens who immigrated to the United States between 1979 and 1982.
Although the respective sample is far from being representative, their ndings indeed shed
some light on the wage distribution under the Soviet Planning System. By including a set of
industry dummies in their estimation, Gregory and Kohlhase (1988) also provide some evidence
for the inter-industry wage structure.
In order to assess the inter-industry wage dispersion, we transform the original coecients,
which were initially derived with an arbitrarily chosen reference industry, to deviations from
the sample (weighted) average according to Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997). As Table 1
indicates, inter-industry wage dispersion, as measured by the standard deviation of the wage
dierentials, was quite low in the Soviet System with only 4%-pts among the highly skilled (70%
of the sample) and 9%-pts (the remaining 30% of the sample) among low-skilled employees. This
provides us with a benchmark for the analysis of inter-industry wage dierentials in Russia's
2Table 1: Soviet Inter-Industry Wage Dierentials from Gregory and Kohlhase (1988)
Industry High Skilled Low Skilled
Coe. t-value Coe. t-value
Observations 1349 − 591 −
1 Manuf: Chemical 0.05157 ( 1.60 ) -0.29778 ( 8.35 )
2 Manuf: Energy -0.02162 ( 0.87 ) 0.20681 ( 5.37 )
3 Manuf: Machine Building 0.09307 ( 3.93 ) 0.10151 ( 2.86 )
4 Manuf: Wood/Building Material 0.08047 ( 0.75 ) 0.24021 ( 6.02 )
5 Manuf: Light, Excluding Food 0.02137 ( 0.53 ) -0.02288 ( 0.28 )
6 Manuf: Light, Food 0.27407 ( 11.37 ) -0.07138 ( 1.89 )
7 Manuf: Other 0.18197 ( 6.33 ) 0.00051 ( 0.01 )
8 Agriculture 0.14327 ( 5.56 ) 0.34321 ( 9.49 )
9 Transportation 0.07817 ( 0.67 ) 0.05571 ( 0.34 )
10 Communication -0.00082 ( 0.03 ) -0.12288 ( 3.29 )
11 Construction 0.06597 ( 0.50 ) 0.22721 ( 3.88 )
12 Trade/Social Catering -0.01482 ( 0.41 ) -0.15708 ( 2.99 )
13 Material and Technical Supply -0.04832 ( 1.99 ) -0.12138 ( 3.40 )
14 Other Productive Services -0.01352 ( 0.49 ) -0.42968 ( 12.06 )
15 Municipal Economy and Housing 0.02327 ( 0.71 ) 0.01681 ( 0.12 )
16 Health and Physical Culture -0.05652 ( 1.08 ) -0.28358 ( 7.79 )
17 Education -0.10742 ( 2.36 ) -0.24508 ( 6.67 )
18 Culture and Arts -0.11582 ( 3.85 ) -0.07168 ( 1.79 )
19 Science 0.00947 ( 0.13 ) -0.09848 ( 2.65 )
20 Credit/State and Party 0.06267 ( 0.81 ) -0.06448 ( 1.56 )
Std Dev: Ind 0.0403 − 0.0977 −
Important Note: The results presented here have been transformed from
the original coecients using an arbitrary reference category as found in
Gregory and Kohlhase (1988) Table 3 and individual industry weights from
Table A1 to deviations from the (sample) weighted average, as described in
Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997).
current transition process towards a market economy.
B. Wage Setting and the Market Economy
The Russian labor movement is still dominated by former Soviet trade unions, which are
grouped together under the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR). The
Federation represents over 95% of the unionized labor force, which is about 50 million people.
Kubicek (1996) states that the power of the Federation relies largely on its monopolistic control
exerted over social insurance funds and goods such as holiday homes, etc. While the FNPR
3lacks credibility and the trust of its members, it uses the access to these goods and funds as an
incentive to retain membership. For this reason, the FNPR also depends upon state recognition
and access to property and state funds, which in return constrains its independence and power.
Smaller independent unions also exist in Russia, which are estimated to represent around ve
million workers. However their inﬂuence remains limited. The largest employer's organization
is the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP). Together with its aliated
groups, the RSPP represents over two-thirds of Russia's industrial output.
IWH-Halle, DIW-Berlin, and IfW-Kiel (1998) outline the wage setting institutions estab-
lished after the move towards the market economy in Russia. In 1990, the \Enterprise Law"
guaranteed the independence of wage setting decisions at the rm level, such that wages were
indeed set at the rm level for about 70% of all employees under collective wage contracts.
However, often management simply set wages unilaterally due to a lack of collective contracts,
or bargained wages were simply not eectively binding. In 1992, \General Contracts" were
introduced, with the intention of supplementing the relatively decentralized wage setting sys-
tem. Their function was primarily to establish a consensus between government, trade unions
and employers on the general wage level, social standards and economic reforms, although they
were not binding.
The simple idea behind this was to establish a common basis to promote continued provision
of social welfare payments by the state, the maintenance of current employment levels by
employers and the waiver of strike action by unions. Since 1993 independent unions such as the
\Social Trades Union" or the \Independent Miner's Union" have pulled out of the negotiations.
The labor side is only represented by the FNPR, whilst the employers' position is largely
dominated by the RSPP and its aliated groups. This results in ineective representation of
workers and employers, in the western sense. The scope of General Contracts was in practice
very limited, because no side had actually been able to fulll its commitments. As Kubicek
(1996) puts it, \the state lacks the resources to maintain the social safety net, layos and delayed
4wage payments have occurred, and unions have not been able to prevent their members from
striking" (p.41).
For rms owned outright or jointly owned by the government, \industry specic contracts"
between government, employer associations and the government were also introduced, which
regulated general minimum wages, an intricate system of wage indexation (due to the consider-
able inﬂation prevalent in the mid 1990's), wage premiums and lay-o rules. In general, these
\industry" or \general" contracts depended largely on the importance of the industry and its
political inﬂuence. The focus was clearly on maintaining employment (job security) and not
catering to accelerating wage demands.
In 1992, the \uniform wage schedule system" was also introduced in the public sector with
as many as 18 pay groups, and set minimum wages. However, these minimum wages were set
so low as not to be binding in any eective way.
C. Wage Arrears and the Market Economy
The issue of \wage arrears", i.e. the phenomena of rms not paying their employees in full (or
at all) potentially even for years, which aects up to half of all employees, plays an important
role in the determination of wages. Table 2 illustrates this problem for the period 1993-2000.
If one is concerned with analyzing the wage structure, then one might think that the absence
of wages is important. However it should be stressed that wage arrears are part of a general
economic arrears phenomenon. According to Ivanova and Wyplosz (1999) total arrears, that is
arrears to the consolidated government, private and public wage arrears and arrears to suppliers
and banks, amounted to a total of around 35% of GDP in 1998. As the driving force behind
this widespread arrears problem, the authors identify the lack of binding bankruptcy rules in
the Russian economy. If payments cannot be enforced, then a circle of ever-increasing mutual
arrears results.
On top of these macro-economic forces, the question exists as to whether there are any
5determinants of wage arrears at the rm and individual level . Earle and Sabirianova (2000)
and Earle and Sabirianova (1999) examine wage arrears in Russia and outline several hypotheses
for their existence. With tax evasion rampant in Russia, the tax authorities attempt to levy
taxes directly on wages and prots, giving the rm an incentive to under-report earnings. Thus
at the moment a rm becomes solvent enough to pay wages, it obviously can also becomes able
to pay potential (back) taxes, leading to an exacerbation of wage payment problems. Acting
stategically, the rm may try to gain access to certain \transition" or \recovery" adjustment
funds oered by the government, if it can convince the government of its poor economic solvency.
An example of successful lobbying for such government funds is the establishment of the so called
\30/70 rule" in 1994, which allowed rms with wage arrears to use up to 50% and later up to
30% of their liquidity to pay arreared wages instead of taxes. Tax payments are legally deferred
and with high inﬂation rates, this is equal to a substantial permanent tax relief, as discussed
in Alfandari and Schaer (1996). Managers may also have a strong incentive to invest wage
expenditures rather on the short-term T-Bill market, which over the course 1994-1996 could
exact 30-150% interest rates, allowing them to pocket the dierence. If managers are poorly
monitored then this is all the more likely to occur. It also could be the case that unpaid wages
have simply become a form of voluntary lending by the employees of newly privatized rms.
Another theory might simply be that rms would like to pay people their marginal prod-
uct. In the transition period with drastic over-employment in various formerly state owned
enterprises, the rm is morally or legally forced not to re unproductive workers, and tries to
compensate for this by \punishing" unproductive workers through wage arrears1.T h i sw o u l d
suggest that only certain workers within a rm and not others experience wage arrears. Some
evidence is provided by Lehmann, Wadsworth, and Acquisti (1999) that this is indeed not the
case stating, \Industry, region and enterprise characteristics rather than individual character-
istics are the main determinants of wage arrears." (p. 14) However this is a dicult issue to
1Thanks to Christoph M. Schmidt, University of Heidelberg for pointing this out.
6address, as there are no publicly available rm employee matched data sets for Russia, in order
to identify this eect fully. This issue is however subject to debate, as Earle and Sabirianova
(1999) claim that there is indeed some inter-rm as well as intra-rm variation, leading one to
believe that individual characteristics such as job tenure, occupation and small share-holding
play a role. They nd that arrears are positively correlated with rms with monopsony power,
and negatively correlated with large share-holding, regional performance, private ownership
and the newness of rm.
The question that immediately arises, why would employees tolerate such unpredictable
payment behavior of the rms? Why would they not simply quit their jobs and work somewhere
else? Earle and Sabirianova (1999) state that those employees who do indeed quit, lose not
only their current income, but typically all previous claims to unpaid wages as well facing an
uncertain labor market. Many simply cannot aord to quit (and hardly aord to stay). Often
these rms not regularly paying wages are large regional monopsonies in \one horse towns",
thereby reducing the outside option of their workers. Of course, during the time that wages are
not being paid, at least the workers have access to rm fringe benets and their accustomed
social environment at the workplace. There is the simple belief that someday their back pay
will actually be paid.
Table 2: Percentage of People with Wage Arrears
Year 1993 1995 1997 1999 2000
Percentage Wage Arrears 41.93 45.31 64.34 65.35 30.83
Source: Authors' calculation on the basis of the RLMS
7D. Role of Human Capital
In order to assess inter-industry wage dierentials properly, it is important to analyze how
people select themselves to high and low-paying industries. In general human capital plays
a major role in determining the selection process. To date, however research concerning the
wage distribution in Russia suggests that human capital plays a rather weak role. Gregory
and Kohlhase (1988) analyze wage premiums for several human capital indicators in the Soviet
Planned Economy on the basis of data from the Soviet Interview Project. In general their results
suggest that human capital, as indicated by the level of education, only yielded moderate
returns in the Soviet Planned Economy. Among workers with high-level earnings, only the
completion of higher education raises earnings, by a wage premium of about 22%. Out of
this wage premium, about 10% can be attributed to occupational choice and 12% to higher
earnings within a given occupation. For low-level earnings, only the basic education up to 8
years of schooling yields a wage premium. Beyond this point, any additional education has
no relevance for the wage determination. This remains true even for vocational training or
specialized secondary education.
However, despite Russia's move to a more market oriented economy, current returns to
human capital, as identied by standard human capital indicators, remain fairly low. Newell
and Reilly (1996), examining the gender wage gap in present day Russia, nd that spartan
Mincerian wage equations do not adequately t Russian data, identifying only moderate returns
to education2. This may indeed be due to the over-supply of human capital (high skill training)
and the traditionally relatively compressed wage structure of the communist regime. Further
they nd strong evidence for segregated occupations and stress the importance of unobservable
determinants in Russian wage setting. However, this analysis only takes into account the
information that was available in 1992.
2However, they nd that men have approximately 50% higher returns to education than women, 90% of the
gap is explained by the returns to characteristics.
8With our data that only recently have become available, we are able to analyze human
capital returns and the role human capital plays in the selection of individuals into certain
industries during Russia's ongoing transition process from the year 1993 until 1999.
III. Data
The Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS)3 panel (phase II sample) consists of ap-
proximately 4,700 households representing a clustered random sample of the Russian population
(Moscow, St. Petersburg and outlying areas are also present in the sample) for 1994, 1995, 1996
and 1998. All adult household members are sampled.
The Russian Socio-Economic Transition Panel (RUSSET)4 is a representative longitudinal
study of Russian households. It provides information on household composition, satisfaction,
employment, earnings, health and political participation. The Panel was started in 1993 and
came to an end in 1999.
For our sample, we chose prime-age (18-65) full-time employed males and females, working
both in blue and white collar positions. Education is classied by three increasing levels: less
than secondary school, secondary school and training and university. Firm size is classied into
the following groups: 1-9 persons, 10-24 people, 25-99 people, 100-249 people, 250-999 people,
1000 people and more.
Table 3 shows the industry classication used in the RLMS and RUSSET and the common
classication we use to allow direct comparison between the data sets. Occupations were clas-
sied as follows: (a) Legislators, Senior Managers, Ocials, (b) Professionals, (c) Technicians
and Associate Professionals, (d) Clerks, (e) Service workers and market workers, (f) Skilled
Agricultural and Fishery workers, (g) Craft and related Trades, (h) Plant and Machine Opera-
tors and assembly line workers, (i) Primary (unskilled) occupations, (j) Army. Observations on
3Managed at CPC, University of North Carolina.
4Managed at University of Amsterdam.
9Table 3: Industry Classication Outline - RLMS and RUSSET
Common Classication RLMS RUSSET
Manufacturing Manufacturing Industry Production
PC Hardware/Software
Construction Construction Construction




Housing Utilities Housing/Utilities Power, Gas Supply, Water Supply
Health Health Health Service, Sport
Education/Science Education Science
Science Education
Government Government and Public Administration Government Services
Communal Services
Public Services
Bar, Court, Public Prosecution
Police
Fire station
Services Personal Services Mass Media
Professional Services Culture, Art
Entertainment and Recreation Services




Oil and Gas Industry
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate Finance/Insurance/Real Estate Finance, Insurance
Dropped Military Army
Agricultural Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery
Forestry Services
Fishing Industry
people with army/military and agriculture as an occupation or industry have been eliminated
from the analysis.
For the RUSSET data set, regions are dened as follows: (a) North/NorthWestern, (b)
Central-Central Black Earth, (c) Volga-Vaytski/Volga Basin, (d) Ural, (e) Western Sibirian,
(f) Eastern Sibirian and Far East, (g) Northern Caucasus. In the RLMS, the regional breakdown
is identical, except that Moscow and St. Petersburg are also identied.
The role of inﬂation in Russia is especially important. We deﬂate all monthly wage informa-
tion for Russia using the consumer price index provided by DIW-Berlin and Weltwirtschaft-Kiel
(2000) from Goskomstat (Statistics Russia) that is dierentiated by year and month.
10Table 4: Weighted Employment Shares, by Industry (RUSSET)
Industry / Year 88 93 94 95 97 98 99
Manufacturing 27.21 24.52 22.08 20.29 20.05 17.06 21.58
Construction 11.05 9.42 9.93 12.03 9.97 6.45 6.10
Transport/Communication 11.95 10.92 12.09 12.35 11.36 11.49 12.82
Trade 5.82 8.65 8.36 10.08 10.04 9.93 8.90
Housing/Utilities 3.41 3.94 3.91 3.42 5.30 4.76 4.48
Health Service 7.58 6.71 7.60 7.76 7.25 8.12 8.33
Education/Science 11.68 11.94 11.75 12.37 10.46 14.60 13.18
Government Sector 13.40 15.34 14.52 13.16 15.67 19.09 16.75
Service 2.77 2.85 3.36 2.56 3.03 3.16 3.67
Mining/Oil-Gas 3.75 3.11 3.47 2.88 3.38 3.21 2.31
Finance 1.37 2.59 2.94 3.11 3.50 2.13 1.88
Table 4 shows the employment shares of industries over the time period 1988-1999, reﬂecting
changing demand patterns. Manufacturing has clearly declined dramatically over this period,
with the restructuring of Russian heavy industry in the market-based economy.
IV. Application
A. Dierential Mechanics
As previously mentioned, in order to access the inter-industry wage dispersion, we transform the
original coecients, which were initially derived with an arbitrarily chosen reference industry,
to deviations from the sample (weighted) average according to Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt
(1997). Thus changes in a reported dierential (with respect to the average) contain two
components: the untransformed coecient coming directly out of the regression and the weight
attached to it. To isolate the pure eects of returns gained from being in any given industry, we
extend the Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997) procedure in such a manner that the weighting
vector is xed for all years, using the RLMS and RUSSET values respectively for 1994. Thus
any changes can only be attributed to the changes in relative returns in any particular industry.
For more background information, see Schmidt (1998).
11More specically, we use weights derived from the sample, which includes both persons
without arrears (i.e. we observe their wages) and also persons for whom we impute wages.
Thus changes in the coecients reﬂect only changes in returns, and not simply the fact that
those experiencing arrears may be clustered in certain categories. We do this in an analog sense
for all other sets of dummy variables such as occupation, rm size, region etc.
B. Industry Wage Structure 1993-1999: Pooled
For both data sets, we estimate (log) wage regressions, following a standard human capital
/ job characteristic approach. The RUSSET provides us with information on total monthly
income (unfortunately potentially also including asset income) and from the RLMS, we have
actual monthly labor income. Despite the fact that many Russians might be very uneasy about
revealing their monthly income to a surveying agency (which for many, may simply be viewed
as an extension of the government), we believe that these data are the best available. These
income/wage indicators are regressed on the explanatory variables described in the data section.
Table 6 (RUSSET) and Table 8 (RLMS) illustrate the scarce returns to education, below
the level of university. University education commands a 20% to 25% premium when compared
to the average, whereas secondary education is actually valued at 5% to 7% less than average.
After we control for personal characteristics such as occupation, education, marital status
and age, the overall inter-industry wage dispersion indicated by the weighted standard deviation
of the industry dummy's coecients slightly increases. (Compare \Std Dev: Ind" in column
(1) at 23.8%-pts and (2) at 25.1%-pts in Table 8.)
This somewhat puzzling result points to the fact that there is actually a mismatch of human
capital across industries. In \normally" behaving economies, one would expect that part of the
overall observed wage dispersion can be explained by the selection of certain human capital
type individuals into certain industries in which a demand for these human capital types exists.
For example, one might expect strong concentrations of highly skilled people to be found in
12the banking sector, and when controlling for this, some of the dispersion would be \explained
away". However such a selection of individuals does not seem to take place in Russia. Actually,
given the training people do have in such sectors as banking, they indeed earn even more.A
likely explanation is that the market simply values human capital, as one might traditionally
dene it (occupational training, education), less, as the Russian economic transition towards a
market economy continues.
Weiss, Sauer, and Gotlibovski (1999) nd evidence for this by examining the assimilation
process of nominally \highly skilled" Russian immigrants in Israel. There is a speedy entry
into the labor force, an initial phase of work in low-skill occupations, a gradual occupational
upgrading and a sharp increase in wages. However immigrants simply do not \catch up" with
\native" Israelis with regard to wages and employment opportunities, indicating a signicant
\discounting" of Soviet education.
If human capital becomes obsolete, people select into certain branches on the basis of non-
observable characteristics or just remain in their industry, thus perhaps leading to an unwanted
segmentation of the work force. A possible direct explanation for this is the negative mobility
eect of wage arrears. Wage arrears are indeed highly prevalent in Russian society, having the
eect that persons quitting such jobs would typically forfeit accumulated arrear claims. This is
exacerbated by the typically ineective legal enforcement of wage payments and the relatively
strong bargaining position of management.
After we control for NON-personal characteristics such as geographical region, rm size, and
an indicator for government ownership of the rm, the overall inter-industry wage dispersion
indicated by the weighted standard deviation of the industry dummy's coecients decreases.
(Compare \Std Dev: Ind" in column (1) at 23.8%-pts and (3) at 20.9%-pts in Table 8.) This
indicates the relative importance of local industrial structure, such as local monopsonies, in a
segmented labor market.
Column (4) of Table 6 (RUSSET) and Table 8 (RLMS) describe the structure of wages.
13All sets of dummy variables: industry, occupation, region, rm size, education have overall
group dispersion measures reported, thus giving an idea of their overall relative \importance".
The standard deviation for industry wage eects is the highest at around 20% pts. High
paying industries include: (a) Mining, Oil and Gas, (b) Finance sector, (c) Transport and
Communications, and (d) Housing and Utilities. Payments in the Oil and Gas sector reach
levels of 31% to 46% higher than average, ceteris paribus. Poorly paying industries include: (a)
Health Services, (b) Education and Sciences, and (c) Other Services. Payment in the Education
sector is in fact even 32% to 37% below average.
Directly comparing our results to those of Gregory and Kohlhase (1988) in Table 1 is some-
what dicult as the industry classication they used is not compatible, due to data limitations.
However, Gregory and Kohlhase (1988) use a more disaggregated classication than the paper
does, and, as such, one would expect, ceteris paribus, more dispersion between industries and
less within. Even though we use a more aggregated classication system, our results consis-
tently show substantially higher levels of inter-industry wage dispersion in both data sets used.
Compare Table 1's dispersion results reporting 4%-points for the high-skilled and 10%-points
for the low-skilled with the industry dispersion of 18% in Table 6 (RUSSET) and 22% in Table 8
(RLMS).
This reﬂects the economic transition process in Russia, where previously planned industrial
production is moving towards a market economy, with industry-specic demand and factor
prices changing very dynamically in a short period of time.
C. Industry Specic Returns on Government Ownership
At one time, all Russian \rms" were owned by the Soviet collective. With increasing moves
toward privatization, what role does government ownership now play in determining the struc-
ture of wages? Table 6 (RUSSET) and Table 8 (RLMS) show the eect on wages to be negative
at -15% when compared to private rms. Is this true in all industries? Table 9 clearly demon-
14strates this not to be the case. We simply extend eqn (4) of Table 8 to include a complete
set of industry and government ownership interaction terms. We can then calculate the wage
dierential of a particular industry for those which are government owned (\Gov't" in Table 9)
and those which are privately owned (\Private" in Table 9). For each industry, the dierence
between government and privately owned (\Dierence" in Table 9) can be compared to the
overall eect of -14.6%.
Joint F-tests show that the individual industry eects do dier signicantly from the overall
eect. Furthermore, the government-owned rms in the Oil and Gas industry pay 9% higher
wages than private rms do, but both still pay much better than an average government-owned
rm. In contrast, in general Services, government rms pay much lower wages: some 37%
lower, even lower than the -14.6% on average. This latter nding is perhaps not so surprising,
as private rms moving into a newly privatized market segment would have a clear economic
incentive to pick a strong growth industry, leaving the government with the lemons. Clearly
the government prots from the strategic advantage of energy based industries.
D. Panel Analysis
As the estimation results of the above person- and non-person specic models indicate, there
appears to be some human capital \mismatch". People with relatively higher human capital, as
indicated by occupation, education, work experience and age, simply do not select themselves
into the higher paying industries. Clearly, this result is puzzling and points to the hypothesis,
that it is unobservable person characteristics rather than standard human capital indicators
that determine the selection of individuals into high paying industries.
One way to control for individuals' unobservable characteristics is to use a panel model with
individual xed eects. Thereby all observable and non-observable characteristics of a person
that do not change over time are captured by a person specic constant. Hence occupational
and educational variables only have explanatory power, if they change in the observation period,
15and are otherwise absorbed into the constant.
After we applied such a panel model to our data, the industry wage dispersion reduces
substantially from 22.4%-pts to 11.5%-pts. This is evidence for the fact that unobservable
positive workers' characteristics help to explain higher than average paying industries. The
result conrms our earlier hypothesis that the market values human capital less, as one would
traditionally dene it, since human capital, which was acquired in the Soviet-period, becomes
increasingly obsolete as economic restructuring in Russia proceeds.
However one has to be cautious in over-interpreting the results of the panel analysis due
to the well known potential of industry misclassication in panel data, as discussed in Keane
(1993). In our case this problem should not be severe, since industries are fairly aggregated
and the classication in fact is comparable to a one-digit industry classication scheme. A
misinterpretation of a respondents industry data-set-entry would therefore require to misclassify
for example the \Manufacturing" industry with the \Education and Science" sector, which
seems unlikely to happen.
E. Industry Wage Structure Dynamics
In order to identify the dynamic changes in the industry wage structure, we also estimate (log)
wage regressions for each and every year separately, from 1993 through to 1999 using both data
sets.
Table 7 (RUSSET) and Table 10 (RLMS) illustrate the large movements in industry wage
premia. High-paying industries such as Oil and Gas seem to be ever increasing, reaching levels
of between 59% and 81% above average. The Finance sector on the other hand ﬂuctuates
between levels of 20% and 50% above average. The RUSSET shows a slow but steady increase
in the standard deviation of industry dierentials from 16.6%-pts in 1993 to 22.5%-pts in 1999.
The RLMS also displays a clear picture, with the standard deviation increasing from 18.6%-pts
in 1994 to 27.2%-pts in 1998.
16One interesting aspect of Russia's transition process is the development of the relative
earnings position of the former Soviet nomenclatura. Bird, Frick, and Wagner (1998) examine
the returns to Socialist Party membership after the Reunication in East Germany up through
1994. However, party membership is not explicitly observed in their dataset, so they proxy this
with \having had a telephone in 1990", which at the time was asserted to be correlated with
the privilege of party membership. They nd that from 1990 through to 1994, having had a
telephone yielded a positive income dierential of up to 12.5% even as late as 1994.
Gregory and Kohlhase (1988) analyze wage premiums with regard to political activity un-
der the Soviet System based on a sample of 2793 former Soviet citizens who immigrated to the
United States. In general their results suggest that individuals who had a leading position in
system supporting organizations received a substantial reward in form of higher wages. For
employees with high-level earnings, Gregory and Kohlhase (1988) estimated a wage premium
of 8.8%, 2.7% of which can be attributed to a favorable placement in higher paying occupa-
tions. For low-level earnings the wage premium for a leading position in a regime supporting
organization was estimated to be 9%, which solely comes in the form of higher pay within a
given occupation.
Our interest was to establish, on the basis of a more representative sample of Russian
residents, whether being a member of the nomenclatura under the Soviet System indeed paid
o in terms of wage premiums and if so, how long into the transition period this eect remained
present. The RUSSET survey provides us with some helpful information regarding this. Even
though the earliest observation period of the RUSSET is 1993, the questionnaire does contain
questions related to the pre-transition year 1988.
In contrast to the approach of Gregory and Kohlhase (1988) and Bird, Frick, and Wag-
ner (1998) we identify former members of the Soviet nomenclatura as those who actually were
members of the communist party. Among other things, individuals were asked in the RUSSET
survey whether they participated in a political party, group or movement in 1988. Since the
17political system was still dominated by the communist party and virtually no other parties ex-
isted in 1988, it is reasonable to assume that members of the communist party can be identied
by this question.
Membership in the communist party was quite low. We identify about 110 individuals,
about 7.1% (weighted) of our sample. In general, membership in the communist party involved
additional responsibilities at the workplace and was often related to certain managerial functions
that are not necessarily captured by the occupation variable. In addition, earlier work by
Gregory and Kohlhase (1988) suggests that the Soviet political authorities promoted system
stability by setting income incentives. We therefore expect that at least in the pre-transition
period, members of the communist party received higher incomes than an otherwise similar
employee with a comparable human capital endowment as a \reward".
We are able to empirically analyze income dierentials from 1993 onwards, as in Table 5,
which is the year of the earliest income observation. Due to the small number of observations,
we were unfortunately not able to analyze the membership eect by industry. However in 1993
the coecient of the respective membership dummy is statistically signicant and indicates
that having been a member of the communist party in 1988 was still providing benets in
1993 with an income premium of more than 16%. This remained true until as late as 1995,
when the membership dummy is nally rendered insignicant. We interpret this result as
being an indicator of important networking eects among communist party members and the
relative slow pace of the economic restructuring in Russia at the beginning of the 1990's.
As the transition towards a market economy gained momentum, actual productivity related
characteristics of workers became more important and network eects faded away.
F. The Role of Arrears and Imputation
In the RLMS, the existence of wage arrears is asked in all years. We would like to identify the
eect of wage arrears in estimating the industry wage structure. To do this, we can run one
18Table 5: Decreasing Returns to Having Been a Communist Party Member in 1988
Year Dierential t-Statistic
1993 0.162 ( 2.30 )
1994 0.187 ( 2.00 )
1995 0.148 ( 1.560 )
1997 0.062 ( 0.560 )
1998 -0.181 ( -1.51 )
1999 -0.029 ( -0.19 )
 indicates signicant at 5% level.
set of results assuming that those observations exhibiting wage arrears are simply deleted and
another set where they are imputed. This is however not possible for the RUSSET data set,
where arrears are identied only in the last two waves.
To deal with missing observations due to wage arrears, we impute wages using regression
techniques. In our case, a simple wage regression is run for each year and predicted wages,
based only on complete wage observations, are calculated, while capturing the standard error
of the prediction. Based on the characteristics of persons having wage arrears (\missings"), we
calculate a predicted portion of wages. We then calculate and randomly assign a stochastic
term, based on its distribution of the standard error of the prediction. Both components
together (prediction and error term) create an imputed value. We use the simulation procedure
from Mander and Clayton (2000) 10 times for each year, allowing us to calculate an average of
the 10 dierent estimates (based on dierent draws of the random component) and an overall
estimate of the variance (comprised of \within" and \between" variance components).
We can therefore compare two models for the RLMS data set: wage dierentials based on
(a) observations with only complete wage information (arrears observations missing) and (b)
valid and imputed observations together. For the RUSSET data set, only option (a) is possible,
as arrears are only identied in the last two years.
We present regressions for the RLMS, having imputed wage arrears pooling over the years
1994-98 in Table 11. The idea here is to attempt to reconstruct what wage dierentials would
have been, had one been able to observe paid wages. In the previous tables, persons with wage
arrears are not observed at all in the analysis.
If, however, there is a non-random assignment of wage arrears, based on the criteria that
\bad" workers (based on unobservables) are not paid their wages, and \good" workers (based
on unobservables) are paid their wages, wages in some groups should be overestimated and,
therefore, analyses not taking this into account deliver biased results. We see this in the returns
to education coecients in Table 11. Over the period 1994-1998 and controlling for arrears,
we nd prima facia evidence of so-called \bad" workers experiencing arrears, as the overall
dispersion in the returns to education drops from 11.5%-points to 10.1%-points. For example,
a university education yields 19.4%-pts more than an \average education", however including
those observations with imputed wages (arrears), reduces this dierential to 16.6%-pts. Thus
those with arrears have \bad" unobserved characteristics.
Examining the eects of industry, we nd a similar pattern. Overall industry dispersion is
reduced from 22.4%-points to 21.1%-points when imputing arrears. The majority of individual
industries drop, and by about 6%-points. The Financial sector drops even by 9%-points. It
seems apparent that in those industries with less than 50% of the employees having wage arrears,
such as in the Financial, Oil & Gas, Services, Government, Wholesale/Retail and Transport
sector, selection on unobservables into arrears plays more of a role. In other words, in those
industries where arrears are common, \good" and \bad" employees alike, typically receive wage
arrears, possibly reﬂecting the overall industry nancial constraints.
V. Conclusions
Russia has experienced dramatic and far-reaching changes to its economy since the early 1990's.
We capture this in our analysis with two Russian household panel data sets. Due to this
20transition period of ﬂexibilization, where wage setting has eectively been decentralized, we
are able to observe large changes in the inter-industry wage structure over this period. Quite
notably, this is in stark contrast to Western economies such as the United States or Germany,
where movements in the industry structure have been slow, if at all perceptible.
The study shows a substantial amount of instability in the industry dierentials. There are
several instances of particular industries moving consistently to above average levels, such as
the Oil and Gas industry, whereas others have been bouncing around at particularly (high or
low) level. There seems to be strong evidence to support the claim that, on the whole, the
industry dispersion is becoming wider than what Gregory and Kohlhase (1988) found before
the transition period. Further, the networking advantage that the Soviet nomenclatura enjoyed
immediately after the fall of communism, exerted an inﬂuence up to 1994, when its eect
became insignicant.
It is also worth noting that, even though there has been a substantial movement toward
privatization, we still observe strong eects of government ownership on wages. Furthermore,
we nd dierential eects by industry.
Moreover, for most of the analysis, standard OLS regression methods were used. However,
we quantify the role of unobserved individual heterogeneity. Exploratory evidence suggests that
indeed, there are substantial person \xed-eects", reducing the standard deviation of industry
wage dierentials by about one-third. This is in keeping with existing literature.
After using regression imputation techniques to calculate wage arrears, we do nd some
evidence for the hypothesis that those having wage arrears imposed upon them are in some
way \negatively selected", giving additional support to Earle and Sabirianova (1999).
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23Table 6: Wage Regressions: RUSSET Pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ind: Manufacturing -0.081 -0.043 -0.159 -0.114
( -3.490 ) ( -1.850 ) ( -5.760 ) ( -4.280 )
Ind: Construction 0.251 0.197 0.191 0.145
( 6.530 ) ( 5.240 ) ( 4.990 ) ( 3.870 )
Ind: Transport, Communications 0.120 0.159 0.125 0.153
( 3.500 ) ( 4.770 ) ( 3.740 ) ( 4.720 )
Ind: Wholesale, Retail 0.023 0.127 -0.017 0.092
( 0.580 ) ( 3.190 ) ( -0.410 ) ( 2.250 )
Ind: Housing, Utilities 0.549 0.467 0.429 0.361
( 9.220 ) ( 8.230 ) ( 7.380 ) ( 6.520 )
Ind: Health Services -0.227 -0.201 -0.156 -0.134
( -5.390 ) ( -4.740 ) ( -3.710 ) ( -3.190 )
Ind: Education, Sciences -0.303 -0.422 -0.195 -0.315
( -9.320 ) ( -12.200 ) ( -5.650 ) ( -8.810 )
Ind: Government -0.033 0.015 0.027 0.071
( -1.170 ) ( 0.540 ) ( 0.940 ) ( 2.550 )
Ind: Services -0.334 -0.384 -0.250 -0.308
( -4.820 ) ( -5.850 ) ( -3.670 ) ( -4.760 )
Ind: Mining, Oil, Gas 0.509 0.363 0.457 0.312
( 7.440 ) ( 5.590 ) ( 6.800 ) ( 4.880 )
Ind: Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 0.185 0.129 0.276 0.206
( 2.230 ) ( 1.630 ) ( 3.430 ) ( 2.680 )
Std Dev: Ind 0.222 0.224 0.187 0.184
Occ: Legislators, Senior Managers, Ocials − 0.255 − 0.242
( 6.120 ) ( 5.980 )
Occ: Professionals − 0.136 − 0.123
( 4.930 ) ( 4.630 )
Occ: Technicians, Professionals − -0.013 − -0.018
( -0.350 ) ( -0.490 )
Occ: Clerks − -0.135 − -0.104
( -3.710 ) ( -2.950 )
Occ: Service, Market workers − -0.103 − -0.127
( -2.020 ) ( -2.560 )
Occ: Craft and Related Trades − -0.051 − -0.054
( -2.010 ) ( -2.180 )
Occ: Plant, Machine Operators, Assemblers − -0.010 − 0.017
( -0.290 ) ( 0.500 )
Occ: Elementary (unskilled) − -0.376 − -0.376
( -7.940 ) ( -8.220 )
Std Dev: Occ − 0.139 − 0.133
Region: Moscow, St. Petersburg −− − −
Region: North, North-West −− -0.004 -0.011
( -0.120 ) ( -0.360 )
Region: Central −− -0.184 -0.177
( -10.270 ) ( -10.420 )
Region: Volga −− -0.280 -0.273
( -8.170 ) ( -8.340 )
Region: Caucasus −− 0.136 0.075
( 4.090 ) ( 2.390 )
Region: Ural −− -0.045 -0.021
( -1.810 ) ( -0.900 )
Region: West Siberia −− 0.429 0.453
( 8.890 ) ( 9.910 )
Region: East Siberia −− 0.390 0.383
( 12.240 ) ( 12.700 )
Std Dev: Region −− 0.217 0.212
24Table 6: Continued...
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employees: 1-9 −− -0.001 -0.006
( -0.010 ) ( -0.170 )
Employees: 10-24 −− -0.114 -0.080
( -3.300 ) ( -2.440 )
Employees: 25-99 −− -0.066 -0.065
( -2.880 ) ( -2.990 )
Employees: 100-249 −− 0.019 0.013
( 0.720 ) ( 0.510 )
Employees: 250-999 −− 0.038 0.024
( 1.490 ) ( 0.980 )
Employees: GE 1000 −− 0.076 0.078
( 2.750 ) ( 2.950 )
Std Dev: Employees −− 0.056 0.049
Gov't Owned Firm −− -0.180 -0.148
( -6.230 ) ( -5.390 )
Education: LT Secondary − -0.230 − -0.238
( -6.260 ) ( -6.660 )
Education: Secondary/Training − -0.073 − -0.069
( -6.760 ) ( -6.670 )
Education: University − 0.256 − 0.251
( 10.460 ) ( 10.610 )
Std Dev: Education − 0.164 − 0.162
Age − 0.026 − 0.022
( 3.110 ) ( 2.660 )
Age2 − -0.000 − -0.000
( -3.020 ) ( -2.640 )
Male − 0.376 − 0.367
( 13.330 ) ( 13.460 )
Married − -0.030 − -0.012
( -1.100 ) ( -0.450 )
Constant 7.782 6.931 8.478 7.669
( 90.100 ) ( 36.310 ) ( 85.710 ) ( 40.090 )
Year: 1993 −−−−
Year: 1994 -0.115 -0.135 -0.147 -0.162
( -2.900 ) ( -3.620 ) ( -3.840 ) ( -4.490 )
Year: 1995 -0.510 -0.511 -0.509 -0.507
( -12.030 ) ( -12.770 ) ( -12.380 ) ( -13.070 )
Year: 1997 0.230 0.200 0.181 0.159
( 6.300 ) ( 5.770 ) ( 5.050 ) ( 4.680 )
Year: 1998 -0.647 -0.652 -0.681 -0.677
( -15.730 ) ( -16.700 ) ( -16.960 ) ( -17.790 )
Year: 1999 -0.644 -0.640 -0.674 -0.666
( -15.180 ) ( -15.810 ) ( -16.310 ) ( -16.890 )
Observations 5935 5935 5935 5935
R2 0.1563 0.2518 0.2158 0.3055
25Table 7: Wage Regressions: RUSSET: By Year
(9 3) (9 4) (9 5) (9 7) (9 8) (9 9)
Ind: Manufacturing -0.145 -0.136 -0.081 -0.031 -0.135 -0.092
( -3.710 ) ( -2.770 ) ( -1.470 ) ( -0.290 ) ( -2.430 ) ( -1.490 )
Ind: Construction -0.004 0.037 0.204 0.305 0.228 0.081
( -0.080 ) ( 0.530 ) ( 2.980 ) ( 2.210 ) ( 2.860 ) ( 0.840 )
Ind: Transport, Communications 0.108 0.176 0.239 0.060 0.213 0.223
( 2.220 ) ( 2.990 ) ( 3.700 ) ( 0.490 ) ( 2.910 ) ( 3.080 )
Ind: Wholesale, Retail 0.160 0.005 0.074 0.082 0.050 -0.036
( 2.550 ) ( 0.060 ) ( 0.910 ) ( 0.570 ) ( 0.520 ) ( -0.320 )
Ind: Housing, Utilities 0.507 0.064 0.125 0.468 0.605 0.305
( 6.080 ) ( 0.620 ) ( 0.960 ) ( 2.390 ) ( 5.050 ) ( 2.530 )
Ind: Health Services -0.050 -0.012 -0.180 -0.177 -0.252 -0.212
( -0.750 ) ( -0.150 ) ( -2.120 ) ( -1.170 ) ( -2.940 ) ( -2.120 )
Ind: Education, Sciences -0.203 -0.263 -0.302 -0.399 -0.318 -0.459
( -3.850 ) ( -3.830 ) ( -4.090 ) ( -3.010 ) ( -4.200 ) ( -5.410 )
Ind: Government -0.016 0.166 0.027 0.069 0.007 0.135
( -0.350 ) ( 2.930 ) ( 0.470 ) ( 0.670 ) ( 0.120 ) ( 2.210 )
Ind: Services -0.123 -0.304 -0.269 -0.520 -0.321 -0.123
( -1.190 ) ( -2.460 ) ( -1.920 ) ( -2.360 ) ( -2.380 ) ( -0.910 )
Ind: Mining, Oil, Gas 0.394 0.210 0.213 0.209 0.396 0.594
( 3.750 ) ( 1.840 ) ( 1.700 ) ( 0.980 ) ( 3.130 ) ( 3.390 )
Ind: Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 0.196 0.421 0.158 0.125 0.156 0.328
( 1.780 ) ( 3.070 ) ( 1.060 ) ( 0.490 ) ( 0.810 ) ( 1.370 )
Std Dev: Ind 0.166 0.155 0.159 0.179 0.223 0.225
Occ: Legislators, Senior Managers, Ocials 0.242 0.173 0.323 0.271 0.106 0.312
( 3.850 ) ( 2.230 ) ( 3.760 ) ( 1.990 ) ( 1.150 ) ( 3.540 )
Occ: Professionals 0.086 0.072 0.103 0.212 0.181 0.201
( 2.190 ) ( 1.470 ) ( 1.820 ) ( 2.280 ) ( 3.100 ) ( 2.770 )
Occ: Technicians, Professionals -0.095 -0.017 -0.059 -0.031 0.049 -0.055
( -1.750 ) ( -0.220 ) ( -0.800 ) ( -0.240 ) ( 0.650 ) ( -0.630 )
Occ: Clerks -0.145 -0.215 -0.155 -0.075 0.022 0.041
( -2.650 ) ( -2.970 ) ( -1.980 ) ( -0.580 ) ( 0.310 ) ( 0.580 )
Occ: Service, Market workers 0.132 -0.084 -0.047 -0.199 -0.259 -0.216
( 1.550 ) ( -0.800 ) ( -0.440 ) ( -1.200 ) ( -2.460 ) ( -1.890 )
Occ: Craft and Related Trades -0.001 0.035 -0.030 -0.196 -0.065 -0.172
( -0.030 ) ( 0.770 ) ( -0.610 ) ( -2.120 ) ( -1.190 ) ( -2.640 )
Occ: Plant, Machine Operators, Assemblers 0.023 0.065 -0.002 0.071 -0.049 0.001
( 0.450 ) ( 1.030 ) ( -0.030 ) ( 0.600 ) ( -0.720 ) ( 0.010 )
Occ: Elementary (unskilled) -0.475 -0.418 -0.371 -0.254 -0.465 -0.357
( -6.380 ) ( -4.550 ) ( -3.770 ) ( -1.490 ) ( -5.500 ) ( -3.920 )
Std Dev: Occ 0.141 0.122 0.128 0.141 0.145 0.170
Region: Moscow, St. Petersburg − −−−−−
Region: North, North-West -0.015 0.117 0.018 -0.166 0.032 -0.033
( -0.320 ) ( 1.890 ) ( 0.260 ) ( -1.340 ) ( 0.500 ) ( -0.510 )
Region: Central -0.276 -0.167 -0.125 -0.114 -0.155 -0.131
( -10.990 ) ( -5.580 ) ( -3.860 ) ( -1.700 ) ( -4.320 ) ( -3.150 )
Region: Volga -0.242 -0.167 -0.141 -0.496 -0.027 -0.267
( -4.690 ) ( -1.900 ) ( -2.060 ) ( -4.730 ) ( -0.420 ) ( -3.890 )
Region: Caucasus 0.164 -0.184 -0.151 0.387 -0.111 -0.045
( 3.450 ) ( -3.130 ) ( -2.130 ) ( 3.510 ) ( -1.730 ) ( -0.560 )
Region: Ural 0.037 -0.060 -0.172 0.006 -0.043 -0.012
( 1.060 ) ( -1.380 ) ( -3.900 ) ( 0.060 ) ( -0.890 ) ( -0.220 )
Region: West Siberia 0.514 0.468 0.194 0.442 0.600 0.455
( 7.320 ) ( 5.590 ) ( 1.780 ) ( 3.140 ) ( 5.430 ) ( 3.960 )
Region: East Siberia 0.444 0.513 0.761 0.086 0.310 0.375
( 9.070 ) ( 8.690 ) ( 10.910 ) ( 0.830 ) ( 5.290 ) ( 5.830 )
Std Dev: Region 0.266 0.243 0.285 0.208 0.202 0.189
26Table 7: Continued...
(9 3) (9 4) (9 5) (9 7) (9 8) (9 9)
Employees: 1-9 -0.186 -0.204 -0.029 0.415 0.054 -0.193
( -3.080 ) ( -2.860 ) ( -0.400 ) ( 3.080 ) ( 0.650 ) ( -2.210 )
Employees: 10-24 -0.107 -0.115 -0.230 0.132 -0.127 -0.156
( -2.150 ) ( -1.870 ) ( -3.400 ) ( 1.160 ) ( -1.880 ) ( -1.920 )
Employees: 25-99 -0.032 0.076 -0.091 -0.170 -0.065 -0.080
( -0.950 ) ( 1.770 ) ( -2.100 ) ( -2.120 ) ( -1.450 ) ( -1.660 )
Employees: 100-249 0.055 -0.021 -0.010 0.040 0.004 0.017
( 1.420 ) ( -0.440 ) ( -0.180 ) ( 0.440 ) ( 0.080 ) ( 0.310 )
Employees: 250-999 0.005 0.014 0.150 -0.098 0.008 0.185
( 0.150 ) ( 0.320 ) ( 2.950 ) ( -1.060 ) ( 0.160 ) ( 3.510 )
Employees: GE 1000 0.113 0.069 0.097 -0.013 0.098 0.062
( 2.960 ) ( 1.480 ) ( 1.820 ) ( -0.120 ) ( 1.640 ) ( 1.020 )
Std Dev: Employees 0.079 0.071 0.105 0.126 0.042 0.105
Gov't Owned Firm -0.147 -0.075 -0.161 -0.159 -0.139 -0.198
( -3.570 ) ( -1.520 ) ( -2.990 ) ( -1.520 ) ( -2.270 ) ( -2.850 )
Education: LT Secondary -0.302 -0.269 -0.263 -0.211 -0.064 -0.145
( -5.900 ) ( -3.990 ) ( -3.580 ) ( -1.560 ) ( -0.850 ) ( -1.650 )
Education: Secondary/Training -0.005 -0.041 -0.028 -0.152 -0.081 -0.083
( -0.330 ) ( -2.080 ) ( -1.270 ) ( -4.110 ) ( -3.670 ) ( -3.330 )
Education: University 0.134 0.201 0.169 0.426 0.206 0.245
( 3.740 ) ( 4.470 ) ( 3.320 ) ( 5.220 ) ( 4.060 ) ( 4.310 )
Std Dev: Education 0.120 0.137 0.120 0.254 0.121 0.145
Age 0.031 0.031 -0.020 0.020 -0.001 0.024
( 2.750 ) ( 2.010 ) ( -1.130 ) ( 0.640 ) ( -0.040 ) ( 1.190 )
Age2 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
( -2.590 ) ( -1.860 ) ( 1.240 ) ( -0.960 ) ( 0.110 ) ( -1.050 )
Male 0.376 0.319 0.346 0.453 0.268 0.388
( 9.140 ) ( 6.140 ) ( 6.130 ) ( 4.640 ) ( 4.620 ) ( 6.170 )
Married 0.016 -0.038 0.071 -0.108 -0.006 -0.090
( 0.390 ) ( -0.740 ) ( 1.310 ) ( -1.110 ) ( -0.110 ) ( -1.500 )
Work Experience −−−−−−
Constant 7.307 7.525 8.143 7.946 7.201 7.061
( 27.620 ) ( 21.140 ) ( 19.740 ) ( 11.260 ) ( 15.930 ) ( 13.840 )
Observations 1576 951 734 1144 814 716
R2 0.3494 0.3084 0.4176 0.1816 0.3215 0.3715
27Table 8: Wage Regressions: RLMS Pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ind: Manufacturing -0.049 -0.035 -0.107 -0.075
( -2.850 ) ( -2.040 ) ( -5.750 ) ( -4.060 )
Ind: Construction 0.304 0.246 0.254 0.202
( 8.620 ) ( 7.100 ) ( 7.490 ) ( 6.060 )
Ind: Transport, Communications 0.230 0.235 0.224 0.238
( 7.900 ) ( 8.180 ) ( 8.070 ) ( 8.640 )
Ind: Wholesale, Retail -0.037 0.093 0.025 0.124
( -1.360 ) ( 3.050 ) ( 0.860 ) ( 3.980 )
Ind: Housing, Utilities 0.090 0.123 0.072 0.095
( 2.390 ) ( 3.390 ) ( 2.020 ) ( 2.730 )
Ind: Health Services -0.367 -0.382 -0.313 -0.325
( -10.610 ) ( -11.040 ) ( -9.370 ) ( -9.730 )
Ind: Education, Sciences -0.327 -0.416 -0.271 -0.370
( -13.240 ) ( -16.140 ) ( -11.010 ) ( -14.480 )
Ind: Government 0.078 0.042 0.170 0.127
( 2.210 ) ( 1.180 ) ( 4.960 ) ( 3.700 )
Ind: Services -0.054 -0.043 -0.030 -0.032
( -1.640 ) ( -1.380 ) ( -0.950 ) ( -1.040 )
Ind: Mining, Oil, Gas 0.636 0.608 0.476 0.465
( 12.540 ) ( 12.530 ) ( 9.590 ) ( 9.780 )
Ind: Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 0.419 0.413 0.462 0.450
( 5.820 ) ( 5.990 ) ( 6.750 ) ( 6.820 )
Std Dev: Ind 0.238 0.251 0.209 0.224
Occ: Legislators, Senior Managers, Ocials − 0.256 − 0.292
( 3.720 ) ( 4.450 )
Occ: Professionals − 0.164 − 0.167
( 6.830 ) ( 7.300 )
Occ: Technicians, Professionals − 0.086 − 0.070
( 3.760 ) ( 3.220 )
Occ: Clerks − -0.148 − -0.151
( -4.300 ) ( -4.600 )
Occ: Service, Market workers − -0.083 − -0.089
( -2.300 ) ( -2.570 )
Occ: Craft and Related Trades − -0.041 − -0.025
( -1.740 ) ( -1.100 )
Occ: Plant, Machine Operators, Assemblers − -0.032 − -0.040
( -1.400 ) ( -1.810 )
Occ: Elementary (unskilled) − -0.286 − -0.281
( -8.980 ) ( -9.270 )
Std Dev: Occ − 0.127 − 0.126
Region: Moscow, St. Petersburg −− 0.384 0.352
( 14.980 ) ( 14.370 )
Region: North, North-West −− 0.200 0.229
( 6.130 ) ( 7.370 )
Region: Central −− -0.115 -0.107
( -6.170 ) ( -6.050 )
Region: Volga −− -0.289 -0.284
( -14.040 ) ( -14.500 )
Region: Caucasus −− -0.192 -0.213
( -7.010 ) ( -8.190 )
Region: Ural −− -0.024 -0.011
( -1.110 ) ( -0.550 )
Region: West Siberia −− 0.302 0.283
( 10.210 ) ( 10.070 )
Region: East Siberia −− 0.093 0.108
( 3.020 ) ( 3.670 )
Std Dev: Region −− 0.224 0.218
28Table 8: Continued...
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employees: 1-9 −− -0.263 -0.192
( -8.070 ) ( -6.140 )
Employees: 10-24 −− -0.150 -0.101
( -5.820 ) ( -4.110 )
Employees: 25-99 −− -0.069 -0.045
( -4.250 ) ( -2.890 )
Employees: 100-249 −− 0.027 0.003
( 1.250 ) ( 0.130 )
Employees: 250-999 −− 0.139 0.101
( 6.790 ) ( 5.160 )
Employees: GE 1000 −− 0.142 0.106
( 6.670 ) ( 5.210 )
Std Dev: Employees −− 0.131 0.092
Gov't Owned Firm −− -0.175 -0.146
( -7.500 ) ( -6.510 )
Education: LT Secondary − -0.229 − -0.182
( -6.780 ) ( -5.620 )
Education: Secondary/Training − -0.053 − -0.047
( -6.800 ) ( -6.320 )
Education: University − 0.229 − 0.194
( 10.650 ) ( 9.490 )
Std Dev: Education − 0.137 − 0.115
Age − 0.022 − 0.023
( 3.620 ) ( 3.950 )
Age2 − -0.000 − -0.000
( -3.910 ) ( -4.180 )
Male − 0.296 − 0.266
( 12.840 ) ( 12.060 )
Married − 0.034 − 0.047
( 1.480 ) ( 2.180 )
Constant 7.510 6.908 7.928 7.222
( 101.340 ) ( 49.520 ) ( 96.070 ) ( 51.610 )
Year: 1994 −−−−
Year: 1995 -0.051 -0.049 -0.069 -0.066
( -2.020 ) ( -2.060 ) ( -2.860 ) ( -2.900 )
Year: 1996 -0.004 -0.008 -0.026 -0.026
( -0.140 ) ( -0.290 ) ( -0.990 ) ( -1.030 )
Year: 1998 -0.473 -0.479 -0.470 -0.473
( -16.770 ) ( -17.860 ) ( -17.560 ) ( -18.540 )
Observations 6725 6725 6725 6725
R2 0.1235 0.2199 0.2174 0.2983
29Table 9: RLMS: Wage Eects of Government Ownership
( Gov't ) ( Private ) ( Dierence )
Ind: Manufacturing -0.094 0.010 -0.104
( -4.070 ) ( 0.330 ) ( -2.746 )
Ind: Construction 0.201 0.254 -0.053
( 4.840 ) ( 4.580 ) ( -0.769 )
Ind: Transport, Communications 0.224 0.262 -0.037
( 7.360 ) ( 4.030 ) ( -0.522 )
Ind: Wholesale, Retail 0.025 0.279 -0.254
( 0.570 ) ( 7.300 ) ( -4.725 )a
Ind: Housing, Utilities 0.054 0.255 -0.201
( 1.460 ) ( 2.580 ) ( -1.909 )
Ind: Health Services -0.368 -0.119 -0.248
( -10.810 ) ( -0.790 ) ( -1.599 )
Ind: Education, Sciences -0.405 -0.309 -0.097
( -15.770 ) ( -2.820 ) ( -0.861 )
Ind: Government 0.098 0.163 -0.065
( 2.770 ) ( 1.350 ) ( -0.514 )
Ind: Services -0.133 0.232 -0.365
( -3.650 ) ( 4.100 ) ( -5.382 )a
Ind: Mining, Oil, Gas 0.475 0.366 0.109
( 9.090 ) ( 3.290 ) ( 0.890 )a
Ind: Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 0.393 0.594 -0.202
( 4.640 ) ( 5.730 ) ( -1.515 )
Std Dev: Ind 0.244
IMPORTANT NOTE:
Eqn (Gov't) reports the total industry dierential for \government owned" rms.
Eqn (Private) reports the total industry dierential for NON-\government" or privately owned rms.
Eqn (Dierence) reports the industry specic return to rm being \government owned".
Eqn (Dierence)'s t-values concern whether the industry specic eect is signicantly dierent
from the zero. The \a" marking however indicates the signicance of the specic eect, compared to the overall
eect, found in Table 8, Eqn (4), namely \Gov't Firm Owned" of -14.6%.
30Table 10: Wage Regressions: RLMS: By Year
(9 4) (9 5) (9 6) (9 8)
Ind: Manufacturing -0.057 -0.069 -0.115 -0.064
( -1.860 ) ( -2.050 ) ( -2.730 ) ( -1.350 )
Ind: Construction 0.204 0.208 0.272 0.095
( 3.800 ) ( 3.330 ) ( 3.550 ) ( 1.130 )
Ind: Transport, Communications 0.191 0.165 0.366 0.292
( 4.030 ) ( 3.240 ) ( 5.650 ) ( 4.580 )
Ind: Wholesale, Retail 0.069 0.077 0.153 0.209
( 1.300 ) ( 1.270 ) ( 2.260 ) ( 2.730 )
Ind: Housing, Utilities 0.134 0.099 0.308 -0.173
( 2.230 ) ( 1.410 ) ( 4.230 ) ( -2.150 )
Ind: Health Services -0.256 -0.280 -0.403 -0.386
( -4.430 ) ( -4.520 ) ( -5.350 ) ( -4.950 )
Ind: Education, Sciences -0.327 -0.308 -0.478 -0.404
( -7.550 ) ( -6.690 ) ( -8.060 ) ( -6.450 )
Ind: Government 0.114 0.145 0.098 0.149
( 1.940 ) ( 2.270 ) ( 1.340 ) ( 1.680 )
Ind: Services -0.046 0.013 -0.116 -0.000
( -0.890 ) ( 0.220 ) ( -1.540 ) ( -0.000 )
Ind: Mining, Oil, Gas 0.340 0.303 0.553 0.808
( 4.560 ) ( 3.190 ) ( 5.190 ) ( 6.660 )
Ind: Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 0.482 0.528 0.475 0.257
( 3.770 ) ( 4.550 ) ( 3.400 ) ( 1.690 )
Std Dev: Ind 0.186 0.180 0.293 0.272
Occ: Legislators, Senior Managers, Ocials 0.403 0.274 0.541 0.118
( 2.770 ) ( 3.050 ) ( 2.120 ) ( 0.790 )
Occ: Professionals 0.172 0.147 0.159 0.193
( 4.240 ) ( 3.400 ) ( 3.230 ) ( 3.620 )
Occ: Technicians, Professionals 0.042 0.073 0.097 0.078
( 1.070 ) ( 1.840 ) ( 2.040 ) ( 1.550 )
Occ: Clerks -0.140 -0.215 -0.122 -0.145
( -2.440 ) ( -3.530 ) ( -1.690 ) ( -1.860 )
Occ: Service, Market workers -0.001 -0.127 -0.176 -0.079
( -0.020 ) ( -2.080 ) ( -2.240 ) ( -0.940 )
Occ: Craft and Related Trades -0.019 -0.005 -0.035 -0.069
( -0.520 ) ( -0.130 ) ( -0.710 ) ( -1.210 )
Occ: Plant, Machine Operators, Assemblers -0.074 -0.011 -0.045 0.005
( -1.960 ) ( -0.260 ) ( -0.920 ) ( 0.090 )
Occ: Elementary (unskilled) -0.289 -0.247 -0.241 -0.361
( -5.430 ) ( -4.430 ) ( -3.520 ) ( -5.090 )
Std Dev: Occ 0.124 0.117 0.123 0.136
Region: Moscow, St. Petersburg 0.247 0.334 0.440 0.452
( 6.040 ) ( 7.260 ) ( 8.420 ) ( 7.070 )
Region: North, North-West 0.324 0.291 0.156 0.054
( 5.980 ) ( 5.260 ) ( 2.270 ) ( 0.710 )
Region: Central -0.170 -0.083 -0.092 -0.061
( -5.660 ) ( -2.460 ) ( -2.340 ) ( -1.470 )
Region: Volga -0.266 -0.329 -0.294 -0.229
( -8.090 ) ( -8.870 ) ( -6.700 ) ( -4.960 )
Region: Caucasus -0.269 -0.304 -0.097 -0.086
( -6.210 ) ( -6.500 ) ( -1.620 ) ( -1.310 )
Region: Ural 0.005 0.029 0.012 -0.084
( 0.150 ) ( 0.800 ) ( 0.260 ) ( -1.750 )
Region: West Siberia 0.355 0.386 0.239 0.076
( 7.380 ) ( 7.550 ) ( 3.890 ) ( 1.080 )
Region: East Siberia 0.246 0.051 -0.098 0.093
( 5.170 ) ( 0.930 ) ( -1.330 ) ( 1.330 )
Std Dev: Region 0.236 0.248 0.214 0.185
31Table 10: Continued...
(9 4) (9 5) (9 6) (9 8)
Employees: 1-9 -0.249 -0.173 -0.096 -0.233
( -4.980 ) ( -2.820 ) ( -1.370 ) ( -2.920 )
Employees: 10-24 -0.139 -0.098 -0.075 -0.057
( -3.230 ) ( -2.270 ) ( -1.310 ) ( -0.960 )
Employees: 25-99 -0.053 -0.027 -0.021 -0.073
( -1.990 ) ( -0.920 ) ( -0.610 ) ( -1.990 )
Employees: 100-249 0.031 -0.012 0.011 -0.042
( 0.900 ) ( -0.320 ) ( 0.240 ) ( -0.850 )
Employees: 250-999 0.112 0.145 0.006 0.115
( 3.450 ) ( 3.990 ) ( 0.130 ) ( 2.370 )
Employees: GE 1000 0.129 0.045 0.099 0.157
( 3.810 ) ( 1.200 ) ( 2.180 ) ( 3.070 )
Std Dev: Employees 0.114 0.081 0.037 0.107
Gov't Owned Firm -0.109 -0.165 -0.135 -0.193
( -2.920 ) ( -3.870 ) ( -2.680 ) ( -3.540 )
Education: LT Secondary -0.223 -0.167 -0.197 -0.137
( -4.210 ) ( -2.880 ) ( -2.650 ) ( -1.590 )
Education: Secondary/Training -0.046 -0.028 -0.035 -0.075
( -3.470 ) ( -2.070 ) ( -2.120 ) ( -4.280 )
Education: University 0.206 0.137 0.167 0.257
( 5.520 ) ( 3.640 ) ( 3.710 ) ( 5.500 )
Std Dev: Education 0.124 0.082 0.099 0.141
Age 0.010 0.039 -0.008 0.052
( 0.970 ) ( 3.730 ) ( -0.600 ) ( 3.700 )
Age2 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001
( -1.020 ) ( -3.600 ) ( 0.290 ) ( -3.840 )
Male 0.308 0.247 0.221 0.280
( 8.040 ) ( 6.060 ) ( 4.470 ) ( 5.380 )
Married 0.050 0.068 0.069 -0.010
( 1.330 ) ( 1.700 ) ( 1.420 ) ( -0.210 )
Constant 7.605 6.734 7.645 6.094
( 31.290 ) ( 26.780 ) ( 24.360 ) ( 17.870 )
Observations 2186 1842 1396 1301
R2 0.3006 0.2873 0.2753 0.2720
32Table 11: Wage Regressions: RLMS Arrears Imputed: Pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ind: Manufacturing -0.005 -0.003 -0.061 -0.038
( -0.410 ) ( -0.310 ) ( -5.440 ) ( -3.710 )
Ind: Construction 0.347 0.290 0.306 0.257
( 15.570 ) ( 14.150 ) ( 15.380 ) ( 14.210 )
Ind: Transport, Communications 0.207 0.205 0.191 0.198
( 10.760 ) ( 11.430 ) ( 11.240 ) ( 12.640 )
Ind: Wholesale, Retail -0.139 0.004 -0.053 0.053
( -7.210 ) ( 0.200 ) ( -2.810 ) ( 2.880 )
Ind: Housing, Utilities 0.213 0.234 0.179 0.190
( 8.610 ) ( 10.390 ) ( 8.180 ) ( 9.680 )
Ind: Health Services -0.347 -0.361 -0.304 -0.315
( -15.310 ) ( -16.730 ) ( -14.960 ) ( -16.500 )
Ind: Education, Sciences -0.355 -0.418 -0.284 -0.360
( -22.130 ) ( -26.470 ) ( -19.190 ) ( -25.150 )
Ind: Government 0.029 -0.008 0.115 0.068
( 1.170 ) ( -0.350 ) ( 5.210 ) ( 3.310 )
Ind: Services -0.117 -0.096 -0.068 -0.063
( -5.370 ) ( -4.930 ) ( -3.500 ) ( -3.660 )
Ind: Mining, Oil, Gas 0.637 0.601 0.407 0.390
( 18.980 ) ( 19.900 ) ( 13.360 ) ( 14.440 )
Ind: Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 0.319 0.319 0.366 0.361
( 6.070 ) ( 6.730 ) ( 7.890 ) ( 8.730 )
Std Dev: Ind 0.251 0.252 0.203 0.211
Education: LT Secondary − -0.237 − -0.199
( -11.650 ) ( -11.190 )
Education: Secondary/Training − -0.035 − -0.029
( -7.550 ) ( -7.130 )
Education: University − 0.200 − 0.166
( 14.340 ) ( 13.620 )
Std Dev: Education − 0.122 − 0.101
Observations 8732 8732 8732 8732
R2
33